ABSTRACT Nowadays machine to machine (M2M) communication and its applications are growing tremendously around the globe as millions of devices are communicating with each other in an Internet of Things (IoT)-enabled long term evolution (LTE)/LTE-advanced (LTE-A) network. These applications are effective and secure only after the successful verification of machine type communication devices (MTCDs). Hence, various group-based authentication and key agreement (AKA) protocols were proposed in the literature to achieve the authentication. These protocols fulfill all the security requirements such as privacy preservation, mutual authentication, integrity, and confidentiality. But, none of them have the credential to overcome the single key problem in the communication network. In addition, they do not have the efficacy to maintain the group key unlink-ability and are susceptible to the identified attacks. In some of the protocols, each MTCD needs to authenticate independently to simultaneously access the communication network that generates network congestion overhead. In view of these problems, we propose the security enhanced groupbased (SEGB) AKA protocol for M2M communication in an IoT-enabled LTE/LTE-A network. The SEGB-AKA protocol solves the problem of the single key during the authentication process and achieves the key forward/backward secrecy. The protocol overcomes the problem of signaling congestion and high bandwidth consumption. The formal security analysis of the protocol is carried out by the automated Internet security protocols and applications tool. The security analysis shows that the protocol achieves the security goals and is free from various known attacks. Moreover, the performance of the proposed SEGB-AKA protocol is analyzed with the existing group-based AKA protocols. The analysis shows that the protocol has better results in terms of network overheads and fulfills all the security requirements of M2M communication.
I. INTRODUCTION
There has been a tremendous growth in wireless telecommunication technology during the last two decades. The main objective of the telecommunication technology is to provide ubiquitous connectivity among the people on the planet. The next big achievement for the communication technology would be not only people but also objects that can communicate with each other using the wireless communication network [1] . The Internet of Things (IoT) is one of the most intellectual mechanism where billions of objects are connected by upcoming wired and wireless technologies to control various things in the environment [2] . These objects are the devices and users having the ability to transmit information through the network channel for device to device, person to person and person to device communication in the IoT network. Machine to machine (M2M) communication also known as machine type communication (MTC) is an emerging communication standard that supports the extensive connectivity between MTC Devices (MTCDs) with an ability to communicate independently without human interference [3] . It is an inspiring and innovative feature of the next generation telecommunication networks allowing traffic through any network infrastructure. M2M communications is an important aspect of practical realization of the IoT [4] . It has a number of applications in various fields such as cloud based system, health-care monitoring system, intelligent tracing and tracking system, smart transportation, smart cities, and smart electricity grids [5] - [7] . As per the report of ABI researchers, there will be more than 30 billion devices connected through wireless network by the end of 2020 [8] .
The Long Term Evolution-Advanced (LTE-A) networks is evolved with several objectives that enable the fourth generation (4G) heterogeneous network with high resource capacity, low latency, flexible bandwidth, low cost at the customer end, good coverage across a wide area and good quality of services [9] . Hence, it serves as the most suitable platform for the M2M communication vis-a-vis other wireless technologies. The communication scenario and security requirements are mentioned by the 3GPP committee for M2M communication in Release-11 [10] . Security and privacy are the main challenges to establish M2M communication for the mass MTCDs in the IoT enabled network [11] . Moreover, the MTCDs such as mobile phones and smart devices have limited computing resources. If MTCDs fail to authenticate and securely access the communication network, the MTC based applications cannot be universally accepted. Hence, it is required to propose a security enhanced authentication and key agreement (AKA) protocol for M2M communication. The protocol aims to provide the mutual authentication to mitigate security attacks by gaining control over MTCDs in an IoT enabled network.
The 3GPP committee introduced the MTC architecture in LTE/LTE-A network to obtain the authentication between communication entities as shown in Fig. 1 . The Mobile Management Entity (MME) and Home Subscriber Server (HSS) are communication entities in the network operator domain [12] . The architecture also consists of the MTCDs, MTC users, and servers. The user is a control center unit outside the network domain. To operate one or more MTCDs, the legitimate MTC user can access the service provided by one or more MTC servers. The MTCDs can communicate with the MTC server through the LTE/LTE-A network. The MTC server is connected to the network and it can be placed within the network or outside the network domain. The MTC user can access the MTC server with an application program interface (API). The MTCDs communicates with the MTC server and are controlled by the MTC user via MTC servers. To enable the secure communication between MTCDs and MTC server, it is essential to authenticate the MTCDs by LTE/LTE-A network.
For secure communication between MTCDs and server, the MTCDs follow the evolved packet system (EPS-AKA) protocol for 3GPP network [13] and extensible authentication protocol (EAP-AKA) for non-3GPP network (WLAN/WiMAX) [14] . To ensure the M2M communications, large number of MTCDs are involved in the LTE/LTE-A network. Each device needs to execute the entire AKA process that increases the computation overhead at the HSS and signaling congestion overhead in the communication network [15] , [16] . Moreover, the conventional protocols suffer from the security issues such as identity protection, impersonation, and denial of service (DoS) attack [17] . In addition, security of the protocol rely on shared symmetric key between the communication entities. If an adversary compromised this key, he/she can successfully retrieve all other keys and probably an attacker would be authenticated by the network [18] . Further, it is noticed that the existing AKA protocols are not convenient for group based communication and are susceptible to the above mentioned attacks. In addition, the protocols fail to establish the key forward/backward secrecy (KFS/KBS) whenever a new MTCD joins or retires from the group. Hence, it is required to propose a security enhanced group based AKA protocol for M2M communication in an IoT enabled LTE/LTE-A network.
A. CONTRIBUTION AND APPROACH
To overcome the above mentioned problems, our concern is to focus on the existing security and privacy issues present in the group based AKA protocols for M2M communication.
In this paper, we propose the security enhanced group based (SEGB-AKA) protocol for M2M communication in an IoT enabled LTE/LTE-A network. The main contributions of the paper are as follows:
1) The proposed protocol follows the 3GPP standard and incorporates the group authentication mechanism that verifies the group of MTCDs simultaneously by using a symmetric key cryptosystem and aggregate message authentication code (MAC). 2) We introduce a mechanism to solve the single key problem by securing the symmetric shared key between the MTCD and HSS and preserves the privacy of the MTCDs during the AKA process.
3) The mechanism is designed to maintain the unlinkability and traceability in MTCDs of a group that ensure the KFS/KBS for mass MTCDs. Also, a session key is implanted between the MTCDs and group leader for secure communication between them. 4) A formal security analysis of the protocol is carried out by the Automated Validation of Internet Security Protocols and Applications (AVISPA) tool. The analysis shows that the protocol accomplishes all the security goals and defeats the identified attacks. 5) The performance of the proposed SEGB-AKA protocol is analyzed with the existing protocols. The protocol incurs less storage and communication overhead compared to the existing group based AKA protocols. The protocol fulfills all the security requirements with competitive computation and transmission overhead.
B. ORGANIZATION OF THE PAPER
The subsequent sections of the paper deal with the following aspects. Section II describes the related research work of the group based AKA protocols. The proposed SEGB-AKA protocol for M2M communication in an IoT enabled LTE/LTE-A network is presented in section III. Section IV illustrates the formal analysis of the proposed protocol using the AVISPA tool. The security analysis of the protocol in terms of security goals, key privacy properties and resistance against different possible attacks is presented in section V. The performance analysis of the proposed protocol with respect to existing group based AKA protocol is illustrated in section VI. Finally, section VII summarizes the conclusion and future work.
II. RELATED WORK
In view of the above identified problems, several group based AKA protocols were proposed for M2M communication in the LTE/LTE-A network. In order to strengthen the security and reduce the network overhead, several symmetric, asymmetric and hybrid key cryptosystem based AKA protocols have been addressed in the 3GPP network. Therefore, a brief overview of the existing group based AKA protocols is presented in this section.
To avoid the signaling congestion problem from M2M communication, Jung et al. [19] proposed a congestion avoidance algorithm. The authors form a group within a local communication area and select a group leader to transmit or receive information from each MTCD. Chen et al. [20] followed the grouping method to propose the G-AKA protocol. In this protocol, once the first device is authenticated by the HSS, the same entity authorizes the MME to authenticate the remaining devices of the group. Thus, the authentication process can be simplified for all the remaining devices in the group. However, the protocol generates the high signaling congestion overhead when the mass MTCDs require to access the network simultaneously. It is susceptible to potential attacks such as MiTM, DoS and redirection attack. To enhance the data integrity and confidentiality in AKA protocols, the asymmetric key based SE-AKA protocol is proposed by Lai et al. [21] . The authors improved the security of the protocol but it suffers from the network signaling congestion. Similarly, Jiang et al. [22] proposed EG-AKA protocol to authenticate the group of MTCDs in non-3GPP network. The protocol measures the high computation overload at network due to asymmetric key operations and suffers from security attacks. Further, Lai et al. [23] proposed the symmetric key based NOVEL-AKA protocol in which the first MTCD carries out a full authentication with the HSS. To authenticate the remaining MTCDs, HSS calculates the group temporary key (GTK), index table, authentication data response and transmit to the MME. Hence, the remaining MTCDs of the group are validated by the MME without involving the HSS. Unfortunately, the protocol did not address the group authentication and suffered from the various security attacks.
To overcome the problems of above mentioned schemes, Choi et al. [24] recommended the GROUP-AKA protocol that mitigates the problem of signaling congestion as it successfully authenticates a group of devices simultaneously. Moreover, the protocol maintains the unlink-ability in the group key whenever the MTCD joins or retires from the group. However, the protocol does not preserve the privacy of MTCDs and suffers from identity catching attack while authenticating a new MTCD in the group. To mitigate the problems of GROUP-AKA protocol, Cao et al. [25] suggested a group signature based GBAAM-AKA protocol. In this protocol, the group leader computes the aggregated signature and sends it to the MME. Then MME verifies the received aggregate signature and mutually authenticates each MTCD by sending access response message. The protocol successfully avoids the DoS attack but suffers from the privacy preservation problem. Moreover, this protocol generates high computation overhead due to asymmetric cryptosystem based operations. To overcome the issue of privacy preservation, Fu et al. [26] proposed the privacy preserving group authentication (PRIVACY-AKA) protocol. The protocol generates the pseudo identity by elliptic curve cryptography. Initially, each MTCD transfers its message authentication code to the group leader. Then, group leader compiles each code into aggregate MAC and transfers to the HSS. HSS authenticates the MME and forwards the group authentication vectors (GAVs) to validate the MTCDs in the group. However, the protocol protect the network from all potential attacks but generates high computational overhead due to asymmetric key cryptosystem. As a matter of fact, this protocol does not consider the group key secrecy and KFS/KBS.
To minimize the network signaling overhead, Lai et al. [27] proposed a group based lightweight authentication (GLARM-AKA) protocol for resource constrained MTCDs. The protocol follows an aggregate signature based approach on MACs and simultaneously validates a group of MTCDs. The protocol exhibits less communication and computation overhead compared to above explained AKA protocols. It fails to maintain the unlink-ability in a group key when MTCD joins/leaves the group. Moreover, the protocol suffers from privacy preservation and impersonation attack. Li et al. [28] proposed the group based (GR-AKA) protocol with dynamic policy updating in LTE-A network. The protocol preserves the identity of MTCDs and generates the authentication message by Lagrange Component (LC). This protocol illustrates a mechanism to update the group key and avoid various attacks. However, the protocol generates the high bandwidth consumption due to complex and time consuming cryptographic operations. Hence, it might be difficult for 3GPP committee to accept this expensive framework for resource constrained devices in group based AKA protocols. Recently, Yao et al. [29] proposed the group based secure authentication (GBS-AKA) protocol to overcome the attacks and problem of high bandwidth consumption. The protocol incurs less communication overhead but fails to preserve the privacy of MTCDs and suffers from the impersonation and DoS attacks. Further, the KFS/KBS is not considered for secure group key management and fails to maintain the unlinkability in the group key.
The security of the above symmetric key cryptosystem based protocol depends on the confidentiality of the shared symmetric key between the communication entities. Once this key is negotiated, each key can be recovered by an intruder. None of the existing protocols attempt to protect the pre-shared secret key. Moreover, many of the aforementioned group AKA protocols suffer from the various security problems. The existing group based AKA protocols for M2M communication generates high network overhead. All these protocols fails to maintain the KFS/KBS whenever a new MTCD joins or leaves the group. In view of these problems, we propose the SEGB-AKA protocol for M2M communication in LTE/LTE-A network. In the proposed protocol, we introduce the mechanism to secure a pre-shared symmetric key between the MTCD and HSS. Similarly, the protocol provides a secure group authentication mechanism that authenticates the group of MTCDs simultaneously. The protocol preserves the privacy of the MTCDs and achieves the secrecy of a group key whenever the MTCD joins or retires from the group. The proposed SEGB-AKA protocol overcome the security problems of the network and generates less overhead compared to the existing group based AKA protocols. It accomplishes all the security requirements for M2M communication with competitive transmission and computational overhead.
III. THE PROPOSED SEGB-AKA PROTOCOL
This section illustrates the proposed SEGB-AKA protocol for M2M communication in an IoT enabled LTE/LTE-A network. The protocol executes a four stage mechanism: i) Group initialization and key establishment stage, ii) Authentication and key agreement stage, iii) Session key compliance stage and iv) MTCD join and leave event stage. The standardized notations and symbols of the group based AKA protocols are shown in Table 1 .
A. BASIC ASSUMPTIONS
Before illustrating the proposed protocol, we define the basic assumptions of the protocol. We consider the conventional MTC application scenario such as vehicle to everything (V2X) technology that allows vehicles to communicate with moving parts of the traffic system around them. LTE-V2X linked with multi-access edge computing (MEC) provides a feasible and effective solution for different V2X applications. The V2X based on the LTE/LTE-A technology assists the vehicle to discover what is around the corner; detect a pedestrian or a car approaching to an intersection even when an object is obstructed by buildings or large vehicles. The evolution of V2X technology supports autonomous vehicles, high throughput sensor data/map sharing among vehicles and improves the positioning by maintaining backward compatibility [30] , [31] . For supporting the application of V2X technology, there are mass MTCDs that send their information to the server. In this scenario, MTCDs are the reporting devices installed in the smart vehicles that are located in dense areas. Some pre-shared parameters are considered at the time of vehicle subscription by storing at the universal integrated circuit card (UICC) of authentication center. The parameters that are shared at the time of subscription are defined as follows:
• f 1 is a supplementary cryptographic one way key derivation function. It is strictly known to MTCD and HSS only.
• As defined by the 3GPP, K GRP 1−i is the shared secret key between MTCDs (MTCD GRP1−i ) and HSS.
• We introduced a unique key identifier (KID i ) that points to the key K GRP 1−i . The KID i is updated after each successful AKA process.
• E c and X are newly introduced pre-selected encryption functions based on ciphering algorithm supported by the MTCDs and HSS.
• For each group, the key generation center (KGC) establish the secure group key GRPK i and unique group identity (ID GRP i ) of a group GRP i .
• To protect the transmitted messages over the communication channel, the path between MME and HSS is assumed to be secure on the basis of diameter protocol [32] . VOLUME 6, 2018 FIGURE 2. Initialization of MTCDs in binary tree.
B. GROUP INITIALIZATION AND KEY ESTABLISHMENT STAGE
In the group initialization phase, the mass MTCDs form a group and ID GRP i will be encapsulated with each MTCD. The network service provider form a group of the MTCDs involved in the authentication process. The group is formed on the basis of certain perceptions on the MTCDs such as same local communication area, services and features [33] . The device with high communication capability, storage capacity and long last battery backup will be selected as the group leader of the MTCDs in a group [19] . The group membership can be changed at any time when a new MTCD is added or removed by the service provider. The HSS and the MTCDs keeps the same framework of the binary tree for MTCDs as shown in Fig.2 . The group initialization executes the three steps such as: i) Assign K GRP1−i to each MTCD GRP1−i , ii) The binary tree is created by the service provider and allocate MTCDs to the leaf nodes, and iii) Finally, computes the group key GRPK i and shares between the MTCDs and the HSS. In the proposed group key management scheme, there are exactly two children for each interior node of the binary tree. The MTCDs are associated with the leaf node and the key value computed at the root node is the common group key (GRPK i ). This group key is used by each MTCD in the group to provide privacy protection and mutual authentication between MTCDs and service provider. All the interior node N i in the binary tree computes the node secret value K i as :
where left(i) and right(i) denote the left and right children of a node N i respectively. The function g is a one way function, f is a mixing function and ⊕ is bitwise exclusive-OR.
The security and privacy of the proposed group key management scheme is established on the fact that ''Each MTCD have knowledge about the node/key secrets on the path from its associated node to the root node (therefore the key values of the nodes along this path) and also the blinded node secrets that are siblings to this path'' [34] .
Ancestor of a node are the nodes in the path from its parent to the root. Besides, the ancestor set is the set of ancestor of the node and the sibling set is set of siblings of the nodes in the ancestor set. For instance, Fig.2 shows the ancestor set and sibling set of node N 11 (MTCD M 4 ). Each MTCD of a group maintains the key value of the associated leaf node, and a list of blinded node secrets for all the siblings of the nodes along the path from that node to the root. Using this information, the MTCD can compute the node/key secrets along its path to the root node including the root key. For instance, in Fig.2 4 can compute all keys in its ancestor set (K 5 , K 2 , and K 1 i.e. group key (GRPK i )). This approach maintains the security of the group key. To secure the K GRP 1−i and preserve the privacy of an International Mobile Subscriber Identity (IMSI) of each MTCD of a group GRP 1 , we introduce a new key identifier (KID i ) which will be uniquely assigned to K GRP 1−i of MTCD GRP 1−i and points to the K GRP 1−i in the UICC of HSS. The KID i is used to compute a new secure secret dynamic key (SSDK ) as follows:
AUTHENTICATION AND KEY AGREEMENT STAGE
In this phase, the MTCDs and the HSS carry out the mutual authentication through MME. The session keys are established between MTCDs and HSS for secure transmission of messages. In the proposed protocol, the security of the conventional mechanism is enhanced and maintain the security services provided by the system. The messages transmitted in the AKA process of the proposed SEGB-AKA protocol are shown in Fig.3 and details of the steps to be executed is illustrated as follows:
Step-1: The MTCDs, MTCD GRP 1−1 , MTCD GRP 1−2 , . . . , MTCD GRP1−n of the group GRP 1 sends the access request message to the MME through corresponding group leader (GRP 1−leader ).
Step-2: The MME transmits the request identity message to the GRP 1−leader to get the identity of MTCD GRP 1−i .
Step-3: The GRP 1−leader generates the identity response message AUTH GRP 1 as:
Each MTCD generates a fresh SSDK i using (2) . Each device of a group calculates the MAC MTCD GRP 1−i , i = 1, 2, ...., n. To prevent from replay attack, a timestamp TS GRP 1 is concatenated with it.
Each device generates its own authentication message . . . ⊕ MAC MTCD GRP 1−n ) GRPK 1 .
Finally, the GRP 1−leader transmits AUTH GRP1 to the MME.
Step-4: MME concatenates the LAI with AUTH GRP 1 and forwards the authentication request (AUTH GRP 1 ||LAI ) to the HSS.
Step-5: After receiving the authentication data request from MME, HSS verifies the authentication request message as follows:
First, it computes the (TS GRP 1 − TS HSS ) and verifies whether it exceeds the threshold T . If it exceeds, there is a possibility that AUTH GRP 1 can be a replayed message and HSS declines the authentication request of the MME. Using KID i assigned to K GRP 1−i , HSS retrieves the respective key (K GRP 1−i ) and computes the SSDK i as shown in (2 
HSS computes the session key K ASME (Key for Access Security Management Entity) by using KDF (Key Derivation Function) for each MTCD. K 
Finally, the HSS generates the group member authentication vectors (GMAVs) from the above computed parameters.
HSS assigns a new KID i to the key K GRP 1−i and transmits the (KID i ||SSDK i ||GMAVs) to MME.
Step-7: After acquiring (KID i ||SSDK i ||GMAVs) from HSS, MME generates the RAND MME and calculates the MAC MME = f 1 (MAC HSS ||RAND MME ) GTK GRP 1 and generates it's authentication token as AUTH MME = (MAC MME ||RAND MME ||MAC HSS ||RAND HSS ||AMF)
Step-8: After computing the authentication token, MME sends AUTH MME to the GRP leader concatenating with newly assigned KID i encrypted under SSDK i by encryption algorithm X i.e (AUTH MME ||X (KID i ) SSDK i ).
Step-9: After acquiring AUTH MME and encrypted KID i from MME, GRP leader broadcasts them to all the MTCDs in group GRP 1 
From IK GRP 1−i and CK GRP 1−i , each MTCD generates the K MTCD GRP 1−i ASME to prevent the modification and eavesdropping of messages transmitted in the authentication process.
Each MTCD generates its response value as GRP 1 and sends its corresponding XMAC MTCD GRP 1−i to the GRP leader .
Step-10: GRP leader calculates the respective response value as
The GRP leader transmits the computed response value XMAC GRP 1 to the MME for mutual authentication of each MTCD with the MME.
Step-11: After receiving the XMAC GRP 1 from GRP leader , MME verifies whether XMAC GRP 1 matches with the XMAC GRP 1 or not. If they are equal, MME broadcasts the authentication success message to each MTCD in the group. Otherwise, MME broadcasts the authentication failure message to the MTCDs. Each MTCD decrypts the KID i and retains it for future authentication purpose. Hence, the authentication and key compliance procedure is executed.
D. SESSION KEY COMPLIANCE STAGE
For secure message transmission between the MTCDs and group leader, each MTCD establishes a session key between them. The message traffic between the group leader and the MTCDs is encrypted using the shared secret session key between them. The group leader and the MTCD perform the hash operation on their common key values and the random number (RAND) of a group that generates the unique shared secret session key. The session key between the MTCD and the group leader is generated as follows: For instance, as shown in Fig. 2 (3).
The unique secret session key is generated between these two devices. It is merely impossible to generate the same key between the group leader and any other MTCD of the group.
E. MTCD JOIN AND LEAVE EVENT STAGE
MTCD join and leave event stage illustrates the addition and removal of MTCDs from the group. For each operation, a node key value of some leaf node of the binary tree is updated that affects all the nodes keys along a path from that leaf node to the root node. The KGC needs to communicate the updated information along this path to the MTCDs. The KGC and all the MTCDs individually computes the new group key. For instance, if x is any non-root node along the updated path and, if y is the sibling of x, the KGC broadcasts the blinded new node secret g(K x ) of x encrypted with the node key K y of y. It allows all descendants of y to learn the new g(K x ) but not K x . In this phase, we consider the dynamic binary tree which grows and shrinks in size while addition and removal of MTCDs in the group. The details of join and leave operation of MTCDs are as follows:
1) MTCD JOIN EVENT SCHEME
Whenever a new MTCD joins a group, the new device is designated to the leaf node of a binary tree. When the leaf node splits, the member associated with leaf node associates with the left child of leaf node and the new member associates with the right child. Both members have the new keys. There is a possibility that the former sibling of the old member have the knowledge of the old blinded key and it use this information to gain an unblinded key with another group member. So, it is important to assign a new key to an old member too. The old member gets the new key after each successful authentication and the KID i assigned to each key K GRP 1−i is updated. As described, the new values of the blinded node keys are updated and broadcasted secretly to the respective subgroups. The MTCD joining event scheme is illustrated in Fig. 4 . To maintain the height of a tree, the closest leaf of the root is splitted when a new member is added.
For example, consider the MTCD join event scheme as shown in Fig. (4a) . A new MTCD M i wants to join the group. The leaf node N 6 splits and the MTCD linked with N 6 now links to the left child of node N 6 . The new member associates with the right child of node N 6 . Both nodes (N 12 and N 13 ) have their updated key values that affects all secret nodes along their path to the root node. After MTCD joins the group, the updated key value path is shown in Fig. (4b) .
2) MTCD LEAVE EVENT SCHEME
The MTCD can leave the group on completion of their functionality or due to battery exhaustion. Once a device retires from the group, it must not be capable to generate the group key and all the remaining previously known keys to that device should be updated. The MTCD leaving event scheme is illustrated in Fig. 5 . When a member associated with the leaf node leaves the group, the member allocated to the sibling of the leaf node is reallocated to the parent of leaf node and provided a new key value. If the sibling of the leaf node is the root of a subtree then the parent node becomes the root of that subtree, moves the subtree closer to the root and assign a new key to one of the leaves of this subtree. The new values of the blinded node keys are updated and broadcast secretly to the respective nodes.
For instance, consider the MTCD leave event scheme as shown in Fig. (5a) . The MTCD M 3 wants to leave the group. The node N 11 is the sibling of node N 10 (where M 3 is associated) and let N 5 is the parent of the N 11 . Node N 11 is a leaf node so the MTCD assigned to N 11 is reassigned to N 5 and updates the key value. After MTCD leaves the group, the updated key path is shown in Fig.(5b) . The group key is VOLUME 6, 2018 updated whenever a new MTCD is added or removed from the group. As illustrated in this phase, the proposed scheme maintains the unlink-ability in the group key whenever the MTCD joins or leaves the group. Hence, an adversary will neither violate the group key nor perform security attacks in the proposed protocol.
IV. FORMAL VERIFICATION USING AVISPA TOOL
The proposed protocol is formally verified using AVISPA tool [23] , [35] . AVISPA supports various security analysis and verification models such as SATMC (SAT-based Model-Checker), OFMC (On-the-Fly-Model-checker) and Cl-AtSe (Constraint Logic-Based Attack Searcher) [36] . The protocol is coded in High Level Protocol Specifications Language (HLPSL) to verify security properties of the protocol. The main objectives of the proposed protocol are to provide mutual authentication and key agreement between the communicating entities. Moreover, it is required to achieve the secrecy of pre-shared secret keys (K GRP 1−i , SSDK i and GTK GRP i ) in the authentication process. The goals of the proposed SEGB-AKA protocol are shown in Fig. 6 . In the proposed protocol, there are three participants: MTCD, MME and HSS. The basic role of these participants is described in HLPSL code in appendix VII. We verify the proposed protocol using OFMC and CL-AtSe model checker and the results are shown in the Fig. 7 and Fig. 8 respectively. The SAFE keyword in Fig. 7 and 8 prove that the proposed protocol achieves the specified goals and avoids all the identified attacks.
V. SECURITY ANALYSIS
The proposed SEGB-AKA protocol maintains the same architecture as EPS-AKA protocol. Hence, there is a possibility of similar security issues in the proposed protocol. We present the security analysis of the proposed protocol in terms of the security goals, key privacy properties and resistance against different possible attacks.
Property 1: Mutual authentication and key agreement:
The proposed protocol achieves the mutual authentication between each MTCD, the MME and HSS by generating the aggregate MAC. The security of the existing symmetric key based group AKA protocols completely depends upon the confidentiality of the K GRP1−i . Once, K GRP1−i is compromised, each key can be recovered and there is a possibility that an adversary can be verified by the network.
To avoid this problem, we introduced KID i that points to the K GRP1−i in the proposed protocol. The KID i is reallocated after each successful authentication and key agreement process. Moreover, the dynamic SSDK i is used to generate the authentication request and response messages in the communication network. The SSDK i is generated using the function f 1 and the pre-shared secret key. The adversary never succeeds in deriving the valid SSDK i as the f 1 is irreversible and KID i is untraceable. Hence, an adversary will never compromise the pre-shared secret key in the communication network. Therefore, the proposed protocol avoids the problem of single key in the authentication process.
Property 3: Privacy preservation and identity theft:
An adversary cannot trace the original identity of the MTCDs. The privacy of each MTCD (IMSI GRP 1−i ) is well protected during the authentication over the network. To establish privacy preservation in the proposed protocol, each MTCD generates the SSDK i . The SSDK i is generated using the KID i and pre-shared cryptographic function f 1 . The identity of each MTCD is encrypted by respective SSDK i (E(ID GRP 1 ||IMSI GRP 1−i ||LAI ) SSDK i ) and transmitted over the network. Hence, an adversary will never succeed in retrieving the identity of MTCDs. For each authentication request, a unique KID i and SSDK i is generated whenever a device connects to the visiting MME. Hence, an adversary cannot generate the encryption keys (KID i and SSDK i ). Only HSS can retrieve these shared secret keys. Hence, the proposed protocol preserves the privacy of each MTCD.
Property 4: Resistance to signaling congestion overload:
To overcome the problem of signaling congestion overload during the authentication process of the proposed protocol, each MTCD transmits its MAC MTCD GRP 1−i to the GRP 1−leader . The GRP 1−leader aggregates the received MAC MTCD GRP 1−i into a single authentication request message MAC GRP 1 and sends it to communication entities in the network. Thus, only a single message is transmitted by the GRP 1−leader instead of transmitting n authentication vectors in the proposed protocol. Similarly, the GRP 1−leader sends an aggregated response value XMAC GRP 1 to the MME. Moreover, MME can simultaneously authenticate a group of MTCDs by message aggregation. Hence, the proposed protocol does not generate the simultaneous authentication request for each MTCD and avoids the network signaling congestion during the authentication process.
Property 5: Key secrecy, key identity theft, and attempt to derive keys:
To maintain the secrecy of transmitted messages, the communication entities compute the session keys in the proposed protocol. Each session key is generated using the IK GRP 1−i and CK GRP 1−i at the communication entities without being transmitted over the network. Moreover, the key identifier is encrypted by using encryption function and the respective SSDK i . Hence, an adversary can never succeed in extracting the key identifier and the shared secret key. In addition, a unique session key is generated at either end for secure message transmission between MTCDs and GRP 1−leader . Hence, an adversary will never succeed in extracting the K GRP1−i , K MTCD GRP 1−i ASME and KID i over the network.
Property 6: Session unlink-ability and maintenance of KFS/KBS:
In the proposed protocol, the GRPK i is shared between the MTCDs and the HSS. Only the MTCDs present in the group GRP i have the knowledge of a GRPK i . Whenever any new MTCD wants to join the group and performs the access authentication process, it never gets access to the group key before it joins the group. Similarly, whenever the MTCD leaves the group, it fails to access the group communication as the group key is updated as soon as the device leaves the group. An adversary cannot link the current session group key with the previous or next sessions. Hence, the SEGB-AKA maintains the group key unlink-ability and KFS/KBS. Property 7: Attack resistance: The proposed protocol can successfully defeat all the identified attacks such as redirection, MiTM, replay, impersonation and DoS attack. Moreover, an adversary can neither compromise the signaling messages nor retrieve any information by delaying the messages. We justify that the proposed protocol is secure against various attacks.
-Resistance to redirection attack: An adversary may impersonate as the MTCDs and establish a false base station to access the user information. If an intruder fails to obtain the user information, it is not possible to perform the redirection attack on the network. In the proposed protocol, real identity of each MTCD is encrypted using SSDK i and transferred to the HSS. Therefore, an adversary can never catch the identity of the MTCDs and fails to impersonate them. Moreover, to maintain the integrity, the LAI is embedded into M MTCD GRP 1−i and transferred to the MME. The HSS compares the embedded LAI with the received one from the MME. The authentication request is discarded if the LAI is not verified by the HSS. -Resistance to MiTM attack: The session key and secure identity of devices protect the LTE network from the MiTM atttack. The secret session key K MTCD GRP 1−i ASME is generated between communication entities to prevent the modification and eavesdropping of messages transmitted in authentication process. An adversary can never compute the legitimate GTK GRP1 . Therefore, it is impossible for him/her to generate the valid authentication request and response messages in the communication network. Hence, it is merely impossible to launch the MiTM attack at the network. Table 2 . It is observed that the existing AKA protocols for M2M communication fail to fulfill all the goals and also suffer from the single key problem during authentication process. Moreover, the existing protocol does not maintain the unlink-ability between the group key for different sessions. The proposed protocol follows the symmetric key cryptosystem approach and avoid the single key problem. In addition, the protocol preserves the privacy of MTCDs in the communication network. The protocol successfully avoids all the identified attacks in the communication network and maintains KFS/KBS. Hence, the SEGB-AKA protocol is comparatively superior among all the existing group based AKA protocols for M2M communication.
VI. THE PERFORMANCE ANALYSIS OF THE PROPOSED PROTOCOL
This section illustrates the performance analysis of the proposed protocol in terms of the communication overhead, computational overhead, message transmission overhead and the storage overhead with respect to existing group AKA protocol for M2M communication in the LTE/LTE-A network.
A. COMPARATIVE ANALYSIS OF THE COMMUNICATION OVERHEAD
In the ensuing section, an attempt has been made to evaluate the communication overhead of the proposed protocol with respect to the existing group based AKA protocols in the LTE/LTE-A networks. To compute the communication overhead, we considered there are n number of MTCDs that formed m group. The total number of bits required for each group AKA protocol are the total bits transmitted by each message during the authentication process. The list of the standard parameters and their sizes to evaluate the communication overhead is presented in Table 1 . The comparative analysis for the communication overhead of the proposed and existing group AKA protocols for M2M communication is shown in Table 3 . The communication overhead of the proposed SEGB-AKA protocol is computed as:
= 64 * n + 320 * n = 384 * n VOLUME 6, 2018 
The total communication overhead of the SEGB-AKA protocol for the M2M communication in the LTE/LTE-A network is 1600 * n + 1912 * m. Fig. (9a) and (9b) illustrates the comparative study of the communication overhead that incurs in several group based AKA protocols for varying number of MTCDs in the group. The communication overhead incurred by the GR-AKA protocol is comparatively less than the proposed SEGB-AKA protocol. But, the GR-AKA follows the asymmetric key cryptosystem based scheme that does not suit to the resource constrained MTCDs. Moreover, the G-AKA and Novel-AKA also incur a less communication overhead. But, these protocols fail to avoid the network signaling congestion when a group of MTCDs simultaneously request for the authentication. Therefore, these protocols are not suitable for group authentication and do not maintain the KFS/KBS. Hence, it is observed that the SEGB-AKA protocol achieves all the security properties of the M2M communication in LTE/LTE-A network with lesser communication overhead as compared to other existing group based AKA protocols.
B. COMPARATIVE ANALYSIS OF THE COMPUTATION OVERHEAD
To evaluate the total computation overhead generated by each protocol, the computation time of the cryptographic functions is defined as [24] , [28] Table 4 . Moreover, Fig. (10a) and (10b) illustrates the comparative analysis of the computation overhead of these protocols with varying number of MTCDs and groups.
It is observed that the GBAAM-AKA protocol has the highest computation overhead compared to all other group AKA protocols as it executes the time consuming maptopoint hash, pairing and multiplication functions. Although, some of the existing protocols has better computation overhead than the proposed protocol, many of them do not provide the privacy protection, suffer from authentication signaling overload and different possible attacks on the communication network. The computation overhead incurred by the proposed SEGB-AKA protocol is competitive with respect to existing group AKA protocols. Different from the prior protocols, the SEGB-AKA protocol follows the symmetric key based approach and avoids the single pre-shared key problem. Moreover, the protocol avoids all the identified attacks and fulfills the security requirements of the M2M communication network. Hence, the proposed SEGB-AKA protocol provides the improved security compared to an existing group based AKA protocols with competitive computation overhead.
C. COMPARATIVE ANALYSIS OF THE TRANSMISSION OVERHEAD
It is worthwhile to demonstrate the comparative analysis of message transmission overhead of the existing and proposed group based AKA protocols. Let us consider the authentication overhead to deliver the authentication message between i) MTCDs and MME : x unit; ii) the MME and HSS : y unit respectively. As the MME is far away from the HSS, y x. We also consider that there are n MTCDs forming m groups (n > m). The comparative analysis of the transmission overhead of the proposed protocol with the existing protocols is presented in Table 5 . From Table 5 , we can observe that the transmission overhead of the proposed AKA protocol is similar to other existing AKA protocols. It proves that the proposed protocol achieves all the objectives of the M2M communication in an IoT enabled LTE/LTE-A network without compromising the authentication message transmission overhead.
D. COMPARATIVE ANALYSIS OF THE STORAGE OVERHEAD AT MME
The storage overhead of different group AKA protocols at MME of communication networks is analyzed. All the group based AKA protocols need to store authentication vector generated by HSS on MME for further authentication process. For the comparative study of storage overhead, we consider m group of n MTCDs. The comparative study of the storage overhead incurred in different group based AKA protocol is shown in Table 6 . The GBS-AKA protocol requires the less storage overhead but is vulnerable to various security threats in the communication network. Moreover, the GR-AKA protocol incurs less storage overhead compared to the proposed protocol. But, the asymmetric cryp- tosystem based scheme is not suitable for the resource constrained MTCDs in the M2M communication. The G-AKA, EG-AKA, and SE-AKA protocols also incur the less storage overhead compared to the proposed protocol but, all these protocols are not suitable for the group authentication and fail to maintain the KFS/KBS. The SEGB-AKA protocol achieves all the security requirements of the M2M communication in the LTE/LTE-A network with competitive storage overhead in the network. 
VII. CONCLUSION AND FUTURE WORK
In this paper, the security enhanced group based AKA protocol for M2M communication in an IoT enabled LTE/LTE-A networks is proposed. Compared with the prior work, the SEGB-AKA improves the security, preserves the privacy of MTCDs and avoids the single key problem from the communication network. It can simultaneously authenticate the group of MTCDs and maintain the unlink-ability in the group key for the dynamic access policy scenario. The protocol resolves the problem of network signaling congestion and avoids the known attacks from the communication network. Moreover, the proposed SEGB-AKA protocol is formally analyzed using the AVISPA tool. The security analysis proves that the protocol fulfills all the security requirements and validates the security against various known attacks. The performance analysis illustrates that the protocol incurs less storage and communication overhead as compared to other existing AKA protocols for M2M communication. The proposed protocol provides the improved security with competitive transmission and computation overhead. To the best of our knowledge, it is the first attempt to solve the single key problem with privacy preservation of the MTCD in the group based AKA protocol for M2M communication. In the group based communication, when a group of MTCDs are moving then they face a new problem in the authentication process. There is a possibility that a long delay and huge computational overhead may incur during the handover scenario. Therefore, the group based AKA protocol for these scenarios in the M2M communication will be further analyzed.
APPENDIX HLPSL CODE DEFINING THE ROLE OF MTCD, MME AND HSS
See Role1, Role2, and Role3 
